In his discussions on the genesis of man and the creation of the universe,
Shah Wali Allah develops three main terms namely ibdii' (creation exnihilo),
khalq (creation), and tadbir (governance). Ibda ' is creation out of
sheer nothingness. Khalq is to create something out of an existing substance.
Tadbllr is to manage and employ a set of created things so as to
derive the required benefits which are conducive to universal weal. With
reference to these concepts, which signify different stages of the Divine
creative process, Shah Wali Allah discusses the creational phenomena.
Another key concept which constitutes an important element in his
philosophy of existence is the doctrine of 'universal soul' (al-nafs alkullijlyah).
Explaining this doctrine, Shah Wali Allah says that a deep and
profound thought on the diversity of universal phenomena leads human
intelligence to the notion that God has created a universal soul ex-nihilo.
From this 'universal soul' or 'universal genus' emanate all existents. But
the relationship between the Creator ex-nihilo and the 'universal soul' cannot
be explained in terms of this material world. There is some kind of unity
between the Creator and the 'universal soul'. But this unity is neither real,
nor comprehensible to the finite human intelligence. The highest degree of
perception attainable by human intellect is this 'universal soul' where it is
able to combine all diversity of existence on one point. At this point the
voyage of human intellect ends. This unique relationship between the Creator
and the 'universal soul', which is called ibdd' by Shah Wali Allah, is
far beyond the grasp of the human mind.
The problem of existence has always occupied an important place in
the metaphysical and mystic thought of Islam. Shah Wali Allah's position
on this issue is middle of the road between the well-known doctrine
of wahdat al-wujiid (Unity of Existence) of Ibn 'Arabi and wahdat
a l h u h i i d(unit y of manifestation), which was put forward by Ahmad
Sirhindi in the course of his criticism of the doctrine of Ibn 'Arabi. As
mentioned by us in the preceding chapter, Shah Wali Allah's stand on this
question is that there is no significant disagreement between the ideas of
these two great philosophers, one from Spain and the other from India.
He looks at the apparent difference in their respective positions as simply
a problem of semantics. Both, according to him, ultimately arrive at the
same conclusion.
Explaining his stand on the problem of Existence, Shah Wali Allah
says that when we look at the things in existence, we find both common
and distinctive features in them. There are certain characteristics that are
common to all things. For example, all human beings share the characteristic
of humanness although in several other respects they are distinct from
one another. At the same time, being a man or a horse distinguishes one
from the other. But all the existents do have a common feature of existence.
Both the 'contingent' (mumkin) and 'essential' (wdjib) have the characteristic
of existence. 'Existence', however, does not merely mean 'to be'. It
rather signifies the 'Reality' on the basis of which we regard something
as existent. This 'Reality' itself exists without any external cause, giving
it its existence. Since this 'Reality' is the cause of all existence, therefore,
it must, of necessity, exist by itself. Hence its existence is all-pervading.
For if this 'Reality' were not there, every other thing would have been nonexistent.
Now all other things that exist (other than this Essential Reality)
are merely accidental. For without the Essential Existence they would disappear
into sheer nothingness. This is the nature of all the things of this
world. They merely have an accidental existence, the only exception being
the 'Real Existence'. Thus it is clear that existence is a common feature of
all existents. If there is no existence then all things shall vanish.
This led some mystics to think that God consists in the existents, or
that He has manifested Himself in these existents. This school of mystics
has been called wujiidiyyah or 'ayniyyah. But there are other Sufis
who think that the existence of all things that exist is contingent upon
this Real Existence. This school of Sufis is called ward'iyyah. They are
so named because they hold that the Essence of God is beyond this cosmic
phenomena.52 There are some statements attributed to Ibn 'Arabi which
suggest that his position on this issue is closer to the school of 'ayniyyah
or wujadiyyah. Such statements have been taken by Shah Wali Allah in a
metaphorical rather than their literal sense. It may be pointed out that on
other occasions Ibn 'Arabi clearly draws a line of distinction between the
'Essential Existent' (wdjib al-wujiid) and the contingent existent (mumkin
a/-wujiid) and discusses at'length the five stages (tanazzulat) of determination.
These stages, according to Ibn 'Arabi, are ahadiyyah, ldhat, jabaMt,
'dlam al-mithdl and ndsat, all of which emanate from the 'Essential Existent'
(i.e. God). Like many other Muslim thinkers before and after him,
Shah Wali Allah offers an explanation of the ideas of Ibn 'Arabi which
conform to the views held by the major theological schools of slam.^^
Shah Wali A119h interprets all such statements of Ibn 'Arabi, statements in
which he identifies a unity between the creational phenomena and the 'Essential
Existent', to mean unity of the latter with the 'universal soul'. This
is so because the stages of existence beyond the 'universal soul' fall, in his
opinion, outside the cognitive domain of human intellect.
According to Shah Wali Allsh, the 'universal soul' constitutes the stage
where a confluence takes place between substances and accidents, and
there remains no disparity between them. He criticizes Greek philosophers
for their lack of vision and for their failure to recognize this necessary level
of existence which transcends all duality between substance and accident.
A significant implication of this idea is the negation of any real incongruity
between matter and spirit. This hypothetical dichotomy between matter and
spirit has permeated human thought since the Greek times and has resulted
in a number of misconceptions about the nature of man's con~titution.~~
Moreover, along with this concept of 'universal soul', Shah Wali Allah
also recognizes a physical dimension of this soul, which he terms as alshakhs
al-akbar (universum permagnum). The entire physical world with
its length and breadth, according to him, constitutes this universum permagnum.
All corporeal bodies stand in the same relation to it as waves
belong to the ocean. The universum permagnum has tremendous power of
imagination. This power of imagination is represented by what is called
'dam al-mithdl, world of pre-figuration. It also has its own will power
which resides in its qalb (mind). This mind is the centre or the throne
('arsh) of the 'universal soul'. The throne is like a mirror in which reflections
of the Creator of universum permagnum (i.e. God) are constantly
cast. Through these reflections the universum permagnum attains cognition
of its Lord and naturally forms an inrage of Him. This image is known as
al-tajalli al-a'zam (repercussus permagnum, or 'supreme theophany', or
radiance).56 ~ h 2 hW ali Allah asserts that the highest level of human conception
of God, whether attained under the guidance of the Prophets or
acquired, if at all, by following the course set by the philosophers, cannot
go beyond a conception of this repercussus permagnum. This is the centre
wherefrom all human intentions, movements, and activities emanate.
The metaphysical thought of Shah Wali Allah should not be viewed in
terms of any given system of philosophy which might have existed before
his time. He has formulated his own perspectives on metaphysics, something
which parallels his creative and original approach in other branches
of thought. Some of his views on metaphysics appear to be similar to those
of the Greek philosophers. A study of Shah Wali Allah's thought shows
that several of his ideas have been influenced by the Aristotlean school. At
the same time, points of similarity are also noticeable between him and Ibn
'Arabi and Ahmad Sirhindi. Notwithstanding these and other similarities,
he has developed his own original framework of metaphysical
Shah Wali Allah does not attempt, like many Greek philosophers and
some Muslim thinkers influenced by them, to establish, on grounds of pure
reason, the existence of ~ o dO.n t~he ~oth er hand, he takes the Qur'anic
approach to the problem and regards the idea of God as one that is naturally
rooted in human conscience. This latent God-consciousness, according to
him, is activated in the human mind and soul by the Prophets. It is they
who, on the basis of revealed guidance from God, spell out the right attitude
of man to his Creator, and then, in accordance with the requirements
of space and time, the Prophets lay down the details of a definite course
of action as per the Divine mandate. Thus he considers Revelation and
Prophetic teaching to be the only reliable sources of the human conception
of
Shah Wali Allah also criticizes the speculative approach of the Greek
philosophers to a conception of Deity as the first cause productive of a
series of causes and effects. In al-Budtr al-Bazighah, a basic source of his
metaphysical doctrines, he says:
One should not think that the ultimate being is actually necessary
as the termination of a chain of emanations of contingent being, so
that if an emanation were to emanate from the Ultimate Being and
another emanation were to emanate from that emanation, then the
first emanation would become an intermediate link between the last
emanation and the Ultimate Being; and the last emanation would
stand in lieed of the first emanation only, even if the latter stands in
need of the Ultimate Being. No, it is not like that.
The above passage shows a clear rejection of the typical philosophical
concept of God in the Greek tradition as a mere speculative theorem or a
mathematical idea out of which no message can be communicated to man.
In the rich and varied material on metaphysical thought spread over
dozens of treatises and books authored by Shah Wali Allah, we come across
a number of original doctrines and ideas. Taken together, they provide the
framework of his philosophy as a whole. He approaches the same problem
in a variety of ways. Sometimes he resorts to the employment of more
than one alternate term for explaining one and the same idea. At times he
expresses himself in wholly mystical terms. Perhaps he consciously addresses
different schools of Muslim intellegentia on different occasions,
and intentionally employs a variety of terms depending on the requirement
of the context.
